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No Appeal: The U.S.-U.K.
Supplementary Extradition Treaty's
Effort to Create Federal Jurisdiction
JOHN T. PARRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
British authorities charged Curtis Howard, a U.S. citizen, with
a murder committed on English soil. Because Howard had
returned to the United States, they sought his extradition pursuant
to the extradition treaties between the United States and the
United Kingdom. In response to the British request, U.S. federal
authorities filed a complaint in the District of Massachusetts on
behalf of the British government. In compliance with local rules,1
the complaint was referred to a magistrate, who ruled that Howard
was extraditable. The district court agreed with the magistrate's
ruling,2 and the First Circuit affirmed.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I am grateful
for comments that Valerie Epps made on an earlier draft. This Article derives from two
larger, ongoing projects. The first addresses the early history of the doctrine of self-
executing treaties, with a focus on the role of extradition in that history. The second con-
siders the ability of treaties to expand or contract federal court subject matter jurisdiction.
Curtis Bradley, Richard Fallon, David Sloss, and Carlos V~zquez have made helpful sug-
gestions as I have thought about these issues, and Jeffrey M. Murray has provided able
research assistance. I also have benefited from a Dean's Summer Scholarship from the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Finally, I should note that, as of the date this Ar-
ticle went to press, the United States and United Kingdom have signed a new extradition
treaty. See http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/ March/03_ag_196.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2003). Because the text of the treaty has not been submitted to the Senate, I do not know
whether or how the new treaty-assuming it is ratified-will eventually affect the appeal
provisions of the current Supplementary Treaty.
1. See RULES FOR MAGISTRATE JUDGES IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1(e), available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/LocPubs/
magrules.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
2. In re Howard, 791 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1992).
3. In re Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Nothing about these proceedings seems unusual except that
the goal was to send Howard back to the United Kingdom to face
murder charges in British courts. Yet the fact that Howard was an
international extradition proceeding changes everything.
Extradition proceedings are often described as "sui generis,
4
because they differ so much from traditional federal judicial
proceedings. For example, neither side may take a direct appeal
from an extradition decision. No statute provides federal district
or appellate courts with subject matter jurisdiction to review these
decisions.5
In the absence of a jurisdictional statute, the district and
appeals courts in Howard asserted jurisdiction directly under a
treaty. Both courts assumed that Article 3(b) of the
Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty (Supplementary
Treaty) vested them with subject matter jurisdiction over appeals
from magistrate decisions.6  If the plain language of the
Supplementary Treaty is the only touchstone, the courts were
clearly correct. Article 3(b) of the Treaty purports to create the
necessary jurisdiction in no uncertain terms: "[a] finding under
paragraph (a) shall be immediately appealable by either party to
the United States district court, or court of appeals, as
appropriate."7  Other courts have agreed with Howard that the
plain language of the Supplementary Treaty provides them with
appellate jurisdiction.8
The treaty language is only the beginning of the analysis,
however. The Supplementary Treaty's attempt to create
jurisdiction must be measured against the prevailing doctrine that
"[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is
not to be expanded by judicial decree."9  Therefore, if federal
4. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 498 (2d Cir. 1986).
5. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); see also infra notes 24-26 and ac-
companying text.
6. See Supplementary Treaty between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, June 25,
1985, U.S.-U.K., T.I.A.S. No. 12,050, at 7-8 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]; Howard,
791 F. Supp. at 33-34; Howard, 996 F.2d at 1325-27.
7. Supplemental Treaty, supra note 6, at 8.
8. See In re Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 183 F.3d 944 (9th
Cir. 1999), dismissed as moot, 249 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 713
(9th Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
9. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
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courts may obtain subject matter jurisdiction only from a statute
that falls within the scope of Article III, then the Treaty-a
product of Presidential negotiation and Senate consent-is
insufficient. Nor does it suffice to say that treaties can have the
same force and effect as statutes under the Supremacy Clause. If
Congress controls federal court jurisdiction, then a statute-the
product of bicameralism and presentment-is a necessary
prerequisite for federal court jurisdiction.
The obvious response is to claim that extradition treaties not
only have the force of law but are also self-executing,"' so that no
statute is necessary to vest federal courts with subject matter
jurisdiction over issues relating to extradition. Yet, this response
may claim too much. If a self-executing treaty obviates the need
for a statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, then Congress
no longer has exclusive control over federal court jurisdiction.
The Supplementary Treaty and the handful of cases decided
under it have received significant attention for their impact on the
political offense exception to extradition and the rule of non-
inquiry." No one has squarely addressed the Treaty's effort to
create federal subject matter jurisdiction. This Article
demonstrates that the appellate jurisdiction provisions of the
Supplementary Treaty contradict current federal courts doctrine
by undermining congressional control of federal court jurisdiction.
As a result, the Treaty's appeal provisions cannot be enforced
without expanding the doctrine of self-execution, which, in turn,
requires greater attention to the meaning of self-execution and the
history of international extradition litigation.
Part II of this Article describes the extradition process, the
adoption of the Supplementary Treaty, and the handful of cases
decided under it. Part III discusses the Supplementary Treaty's
conflict with the doctrine of congressional control of federal court
jurisdiction. Part IV first considers whether the doctrine of treaty
10. See 6 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 734 (1968).
11. See infra notes 21, 22 (discussing the political offense exception and the rule of
non-inquiry); see also infra notes 60, 61 (collecting articles discussing the Supplementary
Treaty).
12. The Ninth Circuit came close in In re Artt, 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), with-
drawn, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999), dismissed as moot, 249 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000), as did
Valerie Epps in her consideration of whether the treaty allows two appeals, see Valerie
Epps, International Decision: In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 296
(1996).
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self-execution can save the Supplementary Treaty's jurisdictional
provisions and then discusses the impact that the history of
extradition litigation may have on the debate over self-execution.
I should note that my analysis here is deliberately formal, in
part because of the Supreme Court's strong statements about
congressional control of federal court jurisdiction. Thus, I present
the issue as a clash between the doctrine of congressional control
and the presumption of treaty self-execution, where one doctrine
must give way. Within these parameters, I am confident that
congressional control of federal court jurisdiction would trump
self-execution, with the result that the Supplementary Treaty's
jurisdiction-conferring provisions are unenforceable without
implementing legislation. 3 At the same time, however, I am not
arguing that treaties should not be able to alter federal court
jurisdiction. My claim is simply that current doctrine forbids such
a conclusion. If we want treaties to be able to change federal court
subject matter jurisdiction without implementing legislation, we
must first lay the groundwork for a more flexible doctrine.
II. EXTRADITION AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY
A. The Extradition Process in the United States
Any nation that has entered into an extradition treaty with
the United States may make a formal diplomatic request for
extradition. 14  The State Department reviews the request and
generally forwards it to the Department of Justice, which sends it
to the relevant local U.S. Attorney's office. The U.S. Attorney's
13. I should also note that the same result would even more obviously apply to ex-
ecutive agreements but not to congressional-executive agreements. For a discussion of
these different agreements, see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 215-30 (2d ed. 1996).
14. The statute allows a country to file its own complaint, see 18 U.S.C. § 3184; Grin
v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 193-94 (1902); 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 10, at 905-06, but "[aill
extradition treaties currently in force require [the use of] diplomatic channels," U.S. Dep't
of Justice, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 612 (1997). However, Congress sometimes
permits extradition without a treaty. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (2000) (allowing extra-
ditions to the international tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia). As a matter of practice
and doctrine, the power to extradite is derived only from treaties or statutes; the executive
branch has no plenary authority to extradite. See John T. Parry, The Lost History of In-
ternational Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 93, 104-24 (2002).
546 [Vol. 25:543
U. S. -U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty
office represents the country seeking extradition"s and commences
the proceedings by filing a complaint in federal district court
seeking the arrest, detention, and extradition of the alleged
fugitive.
Despite the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants federal courts
jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under ... treaties of the
United States," the statute does not apply to extradition
proceedings. 6 Instead, magistrates and district judges look to the
federal international extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, for their
subject matter jurisdiction. Section 3184, which predates the grant
of federal question jurisdiction, provides that "any justice or judge
of the United States, or any magistrate authorized to do so by a
court of the United States" may conduct an extradition hearing.
Generally, the district or magistrate judge assigned to the case
issues a warrant for the arrest of the fugitive and holds a hearing
on the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the requesting
country. s The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply at the hearing.'9  The hearing departs from traditional
judicial proceedings in other ways as well:
First, 18 U.S.C. § 3190 permits the demanding country to
introduce properly authenticated and certified ex parte
depositions, etc., gathered at home. Second, the ex parte
advantages of § 3190 are not available to the defendant. Third,
the defenses available to the fugitive are extremely limited. The
15. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 14, § 613; Parry, supra note 14, at 95 & n.3
(noting circumstances in which a country might use private counsel).
16. Contemporary courts insist extradition is not a criminal proceeding. See John G.
Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1443-47 (1988)
(describing and criticizing this doctrine); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 655 (3d ed. 1996)
("Extradition matters, however commenced, are recorded in the civil docket of the federal
district court, even though the proceeding is deemed of a sui generis nature, having many
characteristics of criminal proceedings."). As a result, the plain terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
could include extradition proceedings, if not for the separate statute and a history of con-
struing extradition proceedings to be outside its scope.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 36 (cataloguing
the various amendments to the extradition statutes).
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. State judges may hold extradition hearings, but examples
are rare. See Parry, supra note 14, at 95 n.4.
19. See In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1995); FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5);
FED. R. EvID. 1100(d)(3). The federal rules of civil and appellate procedure apply to ap-
peals under the Supplementary Treaty. See In re Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1326 (1st Cir.
1993) (quoting treaty language providing for application of federal rules).
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fugitive, for example, cannot introduce evidence that
contradicts the demanding country's proof; evidence to
establish alibi; evidence of insanity; and evidence that the
statute of limitations has run. Fourth, the actual guilt of the
fugitive does not have to be established, but instead the
demanding country need only show probable cause that he is
guilty.
20
The accused may contend that she has been accused of a political
offense-such as treason, spying, or possibly common crimes
committed for political purposes. On the other hand, the rule of
non-inquiry forbids U.S. judges from considering the fairness of
2the proceedings that await the accused in the requesting country.
If the evidence is sufficient and the offense is prosecutable
under the relevant extradition treaty, the judge certifies that the
person is extraditable." Settled doctrine prevents the extraditee
from taking the case to the court of appeals.24 The no-appeal rule
also bars district courts from reviewing a magistrate's extradition
decision.25 This rule derives in part from the language of the
statute, which states that the case should be sent to the Secretary
of State if the judge finds in favor of extradition.26
20. First Nat'l Bank of New York v. Aristeguita, 287 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1960)
(citations omitted), vacated as moot, 375 U.S. 49 (1963). For a detailed description of pro-
cedure and issues at the hearing, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 654-789. For a critical
view of the entire extradition process, see Kester, supra note 16.
21. For an overview of the political offense exception, see BASSIOUNI, supra note 16,
at 502-83; CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY 264-70 (1992).
22. See John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on
Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1990); Jacques Semmelman, Fed-
eral Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Pro-
ceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991). The Supplementary Treaty creates a limited
exception to this rule. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
24. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); supra note 5 and accompanying
text. The no-appeal rule also applies if the judge decides against extradition, but the gov-
ernment is free to file a new complaint (put differently, res judicata does not apply in ex-
tradition proceedings). See Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125-30; see also Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d
416, 418 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting in the context of deportation proceedings that the govern-
ment filed and lost four extradition requests); In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (granting a second request for extradition after the first was denied).
25. See Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding habeas corpus
provides the only opportunity for district court review of a magistrate's extradition deci-
sion).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (requiring the judge or magistrate to certify a favorable ex-
tradition ruling directly to the Secretary of State).
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Upon receipt of the certification of extraditability, the
Secretary reviews the case and usually executes a warrant for
surrender of the accused. However, the Secretary also has
discretion to refuse surrender. 27  The accused may seek habeas
relief before or after the Secretary executes the warrant,2 but the
court's review is limited to three issues: whether the trial judge had
jurisdiction; whether the offense is within the treaty; and "whether
there was any evidence warranting the finding that there were
reasonable grounds to believe the accused guilty.
29
The singular characteristics of the extradition process have
fostered doubts about the nature of the proceeding before the
judge. Some courts believe extradition is an Article III
proceeding,30 and at least one judge suggests it could be an Article
II proceeding.3' Under the dominant. view, extradition is an
Article I proceeding.32 The debate largely turns on the fact that
the Secretary of State may refuse extradition based on
disagreement with the judge's legal conclusions.33 According to
several courts, the power to deny surrender is a form of executive
review over the judge's decision.
27. See In re Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993) (describing the Secretary as
"the ultimate decision maker"); LoBue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 68-70 (D.D.C.
1995), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996); WHITEMAN, supra
note 10, at 1027-28, 1046. The Secretary has exercised discretion against extradition in a
handful of cases since 1940. See Parry, supra note 14, at 153 n.314.
28. See WHITEMAN, supra note 10, at 1020-23.
29. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). Some lower courts have tried to
loosen the standard in recent years, and the proper scope of extradition habeas remains
the topic of debate. See Parry, supra note 14, at 153-58.
30. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997); LoBue v. Christo-
pher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
31. See In re Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., dissenting); In re
Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J., joined by Pregerson, Reinhardt, and
O'Scannlain, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
32. See Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997); LoDuca v. United
States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1105-09 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125-30 (2d Cir.
1981). For a discussion of how federal courts came to be so confused about the nature of
extradition litigation, see Parry, supra note 14, at 125-50, 158-65.
33. See LoBue, 893 F. Supp. at 68-70.
34. See LoDuca, 93 F.3d at 1105-09; United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 499 &
n.10 (2d Cir. 1986); Mackin, 668 F.2d at 126-27, 129; LoBue, 893 F. Supp. at 70-73. But
see DeSilva, 125 F.3d at 1113 (stating refusal to extradite is no different than other discre-
tionary refusals to take advantage of a favorable judgment); In re Artt, 158 F.3d 462, 464
(9th Cir. 1998) (adopting DeSilva's analysis), withdrawn, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999), dis-
missed as moot, 249 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Parry, supra note 14, at 150-53 (dis-
cussing the history and nature of executive review).
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Several inferences follow from the conclusion that the
Secretary of State exercises executive review over extradition
decisions. First, extradition proceedings are not cases or
controversies within the meaning of Article III because the
judiciary cannot render a final and conclusive judgment." Second,
the magistrates and district judges who preside over extradition
hearings are not "courts" for purposes of Article III, precisely
because their decisions are subject to executive review.3 ' Finally,
because extradition proceedings under the current statute are
outside Article III, neither the general federal question statute
3 7
nor the general appellate jurisdiction statute can apply to
extradition proceedings.
These conclusions raise several issues about the roles that
federal judges and magistrates play in extradition proceedings.39
Most important for this Article is that, under the dominant view
that extradition proceedings are outside the scope of Article III,
the general appellate jurisdiction statute does not apply.
Moreover, even if extradition is an Article III proceeding, the
weight of doctrine and practice still precludes an appeal under §
1291 - to my knowledge, no federal court has ever allowed a
direct appeal in an extradition case.40 Therefore, the district and
appellate courts must locate another source of authority for
35. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227-28 (1995) (holding Article
III necessitates the judgments of federal courts be final and conclusive). Habeas corpus
challenges to the validity of an extradition, on the other hand, are Article III cases and fall
within the grant of jurisdiction to district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2003).
36. Judge Friendly explained that the extradition statute vests jurisdiction in "judges"
acting pursuant to Article I, not "courts" acting under Article III:
We thus need not consider whether, consistent with Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 408, 1 L. Ed. 436 (1792), Congress could constitutionally vest an Article
III court with the nonjudicial function of issuing the certificate - nonjudicial be-
cause, as pointed out in Mackin, 668 F.2d at 136 n.9, the Secretary of State is not
bound to extradite even if the certificate is granted.
United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 499 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (vesting "district courts" with jurisdiction over "civil actions").
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (allowing appeals only from "final decisions of the district
courts").
39. See Parry, supra note 14, at 165-69.
40. In addition to the weight of history and practice, one could argue that an extradi-
tion proceeding is analogous to a preliminary hearing, making the court's decision not "fi-
nal" for purposes of § 1291. See Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.
1984) (stating the extradition certification "was not a final order warranting a direct ap-
peal").
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jurisdiction to hear extradition appeals.41  The question, then,
becomes whether a statute must grant that authority or whether a
treaty can be sufficient.
B. The U.S-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty
The Supplementary Treaty was a direct response to four cases
in which federal judges refused to extradite individuals accused of
committing violent crimes in the United States in support of Irish
Republican Army efforts in Northern Ireland.42 In each case, the
accused claimed immunity from extradition to Britain under the
political offense exception. During the litigation of these cases,
Congress attempted to revise the extradition statutes. Proposals
included allowing direct appeals from certification decisions,
codifying or modifying the political offense exception, and relaxing
the non-inquiry rule. However, extradition reform efforts failed
41. The possibility that extradition proceedings may be outside Article III would not
prevent an Article III court from hearing appeals if its decision would be final and conclu-
sive. See Richard M. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Arti-
cle I1, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (1988); Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 166; Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 227-28 (1995) (holding judgments of federal courts must be final and conclu-
sive).
42. The four cases involved Joseph Doherty, Desmond Mackin, Peter McMullen, and
William Quinn. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986) (rejecting gov-
ernment's effort to obtain declaratory relief from denial of extradition); In re Mackin, 668
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (rejecting government's effort to take direct appeal from denial of
extradition); McMullen v. United States, 989 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (de-
scribing failed 1978 extradition proceedings); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 786 (9th
Cir. 1986) (describing district court's grant of habeas on political offense grounds). For
descriptions of the Supplementary Treaty as a response to these cases, see Statement of
Deputy Attorney General Lowell Jensen to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Aug. 1, 1985, reprinted in 131 CONG. REC. S10,787 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985); 132 CONG.
REC. S 9,120 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar). By the time the treaty
entered into force, the Ninth Circuit had ruled in habeas corpus proceedings that Quinn
was not entitled to the political offense exception from extradition, see Quinn, 783 F.2d
776, and Mackin had long since been deported to Ireland, see IRA Suspect Sent to Ireland,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1982, § 1, at 2. After a new proceeding under the Supplementary
Treaty, the government was able to extradite McMullen. See IRA Suspect Extradited to
Britain, U.P.I., Mar. 30, 1996; McMullen, 989 F.2d 603. Rather than reopen extradition
proceedings against Doherty, the government deported him to England. See INS v. Do-
herty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992) (upholding Attorney General's refusal to reopen deportation
proceedings).
43. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 657-58 (summarizing proposed revisions);
United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, S. Hrg. 703, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 72-78 (1985) [hereinafter Foreign Relations Hearings] (testimony of Rep. William
2003]
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during the same period that the Senate was considering the
Supplementary Treaty.
Some further context may also be relevant. Beginning with its
consent to the Jay Treaty in 1795, the Senate has sporadically
insisted on its ability to modify treaties by reservations,
understandings, declarations, and other conditions."4  More
recently, the executive branch has included proposed conditions
when it transmits human rights treaties to the Senate, and the
Senate has usually adopted those or similar conditions.45 Shortly
after it consented to the Supplementary Treaty, moreover, the
Senate-controlled by Democrats after the 1986 election-became
involved in an intense debate with the Reagan administration over
the Senate's power to play a role in defining this country's treaty• • 46
obligations. The Senate's treatment of the Supplementary Treaty
presaged that debate.
The original version of the Supplementary Treaty was signed
on June 25, 1985 and transmitted to the Senate the following
month.47  The primary goal of the Treaty was to narrow the
political offense exception by listing crimes to which it would not
apply. The draft Treaty encountered bipartisan resistance in the
Senate and criticism from some commentators."s The Senate
Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees held four hearings on
the Supplementary Treaty over the next several months. The
hearings made clear that the Senate would not consent to it as
negotiated, and several Senators called for modifications. 49
Hughes) (discussing proposed revisions, including possible relaxation of the rule of non-
inquiry).
44. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Condi-
tional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 404-10 (2000).
45. Id. at 414-16.
46. See Symposium, Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation, 137 U. PENN. L. REV. 1351
(1989); John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution, and the Rule of Law,
42 VA. J. INT'L L. 163 (2001).
47. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 6, at 1.
48. Compare Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Ex-
ception to Extradition, 15 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 109 (1986) (criticizing the original
version of the treaty), with Abraham D. Sofaer, The Political Offense Exception and Ter-
rorism, 15 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 125 (1986) (State Department Legal Advisor's de-
fense of the original version).
49. Senator Eagleton may have been the first to suggest modifying the treaty, and he
proposed adapting some of the language of the failed revisions to the extradition statutes.
See Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 43, at 75-76 (statement of Senator Eagleton)
("I think the treaty before us is flawed and will either be rejected by this committee out-
right or will necessitate some amendment or amendments.... Suppose we took the guts of
[Vol. 25:543
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Rather than reject the Supplementary Treaty or call upon the
Administration to renegotiate it, several members of the Foreign
Relations Committee drafted amendments. The Committee
subsequently recommended that the Senate consent to the Treaty
as amended. 0 According to Senator Lugar, Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, "[t]hese amendments were
developed in close consultation with the administration and the
British Government. While both governments would have
preferred that the Senate approve the treaty as submitted, both
were willing to accept the committee's changes."5  After the
the 1983 and 1984 Senate judiciary bill [on extradition] as a guideline for amending the
supplemental treaty."); see also id. at 221 (statement of Senator Eagleton). Other Sena-
tors quickly agreed. See id. at 85 (statement of Senator Pell); id. at 158, 159 (statement of
Senator Kerry). At least one witness also called for modifications to the treaty. See Sup-
plementary Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, S. Hrg. 523, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
142 (1985) (statement of Prof. John F. Murphy) (advocating ratification, but only with a
reservation allowing an inquiry into the fairness of the proceeding awaiting the accused in
the requesting country). Murphy drew in part on Christopher Pyle's testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee. See id. at 141-42; Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note
43, at 109-11 (statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle).
50. Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, June 25, 1985, U.S.-
U.K., S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-8 (1985) [hereinafter Treaty Report]. Cherif Bassiouni de-
scribed the Committee's rewriting of the treaty as "unprecedented." M. Cherif Bassiouni,
The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K. - A
Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 255, 258 (1987) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Political Offense]. Specifically,
Bassiouni noted that "to a great extent, the Senate departed from its constitutional role of
advice and consent, and virtually took over the President's prerogative to make treaties by
redrafting a treaty that had already been signed." Id. These concerns may be a bit over-
stated. Although the Senate's action was unusual, the President has the option not to rat-
ify if he disagrees. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 211 (1997); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 443-
44 (providing an example of presidential refusal to ratify); David M. Golove, Treaty-
Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the
Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1160-61 (2000) (noting President Washington's
doubts about ratifying the Jay Treaty after the Senate refused its consent to one article).
Bassiouni's position may derive from his general opposition to the Senate's practice of at-
taching reservations to treaties. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1169 (1993). Compare Moore, supra note 46, at 187 (declaring the Sen-
ate may, "attach understandings, reservations, international conditions to be agreed by the
other party, or even require substantive amendment and revision of the treaty"). For ad-
ditional discussion of this issue, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 44, and sources cited
therein.
51. 132 CONG. REC. S 9,148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
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Senate gave its consent, President Reagan ratified the amended
Supplementary Treaty.
The amendments narrowed the categories of offenses
excluded from the political offense exception in the original
version of the Treaty. They also added a new Article 3. The new
Article 3(a) relaxes the rule of non-inquiry:
Extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to
the satisfaction of the judicial authority by a preponderance of
the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if
surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or
restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion,
nationality, or political opinions.
Furthermore, Article 3(b) declares: "A finding under paragraph
(a) shall be immediately appealable by either party to the United
States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate. 54
Significantly, Article 3 does not disturb the Secretary of State's
authority to review extradition decisions.
The Committee report and the Senate debate focused on the
proper scope of the political offense exception and the
modification to the non-inquiry rule.55  The Supplementary
52. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 6, at 1, 4.
53. Id. at 7; Treaty Report, supra note 50, at 10.
54. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 6, at 8; Treaty Report, supra note 50, at 10.
55. For example, the committee report identifies Senators Lugar and Eagleton as the
authors of the amendments, but then reproduces a colloquy between Senators Biden,
Kerry, and Lugar from a committee meeting as a guide to the proper scope of Article 3(a).
See Treaty Report, supra note 50, at 4-5. During the debate in the full Senate, Senator
Eagleton claimed primary authorship of Article 3(a) and declared that its scope was nar-
rower than the Biden-Kerry-Lugar colloquy would indicate. See 132 Cong. Rec. S 9,166-
67 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). Senator Lugar avoided agreeing with Senator Eagleton's
claims of primary authorship, see id. at S 9,167, while Senator Pell acknowledged the im-
portant role played by Senator Eagleton "as we all tried to work out a possible compro-
mise." Id. (emphasis added). On the second day of debate, several Senators attempted to
refute Senator Eagleton's claims and to reassert the colloquy as the key to interpreting
Article 3(a). See 132 Cong. Rec. S9252 (July 17, 1986) (statement of Senator Kerry); id. at
S9259 (statement of Senator Levin); id. at S9260-62 (statement of Senator Biden) (disput-
ing Eagleton's claim of primary authorship and his interpretation of Article 3(a)). Inter-
estingly, when Senator Eagleton asked Senator Lugar whether he found "anything in my
speech on article 3(a) which did violence in any way, shape, or form to the meaning of the
supplementary treaty," Senator Lugar said only that "[tihe Senator's speech was eloquent
and scholarly." Id. at S9252; see also Quigley, supra note 22, at 432-33 (concluding "the
dominant view among the senators" was for an inquiry broader than Eagleton's interpre-
tation).
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Treaty's attempt to create federal court subject matter jurisdiction
received little attention. The committee report only provided a
description of how the appeal process would work, with an
overriding concern for what rules would apply to the proceeding. 6
During the debate, Senator Lugar revealed the Committee's
intention in creating the appeal process:
As the individual already has an effective right of appeal by way
of filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, this section gives
the Government a right of appeal it does not have under
current extradition law. In view of the effect of a finding under
article 3(a) in favor of the defendant, I believe the grant of
appeal rights to the Government is warranted."
Senator Hatch addressed the new appeals procedure in the course
of opposing the Supplementary Treaty. Specifically, he objected
to Article 3 as "a fundamental change in extradition practice and
therefore a fundamental change in American legal procedure by
means of the treaty process."'  He also declared that he was
"profoundly disturbed" by Article 3(b), because it would displace
decades of extradition doctrine by establishing that "[t]he U.S.
Government ordinarily, and just about always, does not have the
right of appeal either by statute or by case law."'59
Commentators have also focused most of their attention, on
the limits the Supplementary Treaty places on the political offense
exception to extradition and the inroads it has made on the rule of
56. The report stated,
Because an initial finding may either be made by a Federal magistrate or Federal
district court judge, Article 3(b) makes either the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, "as appropriate," controlling on
appeal. If the appeal is from a Federal magistrate's decision, it is to be lodged in
Federal district court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply. If it
is from a Federal district court, the appeal, of course, is to be lodged with the
appropriate U.S. court of appeals and the Federal Rules and [sic] Appellate Pro-
cedure are to control. This article is not intended to make the Federal rules
generally applicable to the extradition hearing itself, but only to the appeal of a
decision under Article 3(a).
Treaty Report, supra note 50, at 8.
57. 132 Cong. Rec. S 9,148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986). Essentially, Article 3(b) partially
overrules In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), which not only was one of the cases
that gave rise to the treaty but also reaffirmed the longstanding doctrine that the govern-
ment cannot bring a direct appeal from an adverse ruling in an extradition proceeding.
See supra notes 5, 24-26 and accompanying text (discussing the no-appeal rule).
58. 132 Cong. Rec. S 9,160 (daily ed. July 16, 1986).
59. Id. at S 9,159. Senator Hatch was one of ten senators who voted to refuse con-
sent. See id. at S 9.273.
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non-inquiry.6 The Treaty's effort to create federal court appellate
jurisdiction has received far less discussion.6'
C. Judicial Interpretations of Article 3(b)
In three cases, federal courts have relied on Article 3(b) of
the Supplemental Treaty to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over
direct appeals in extradition cases. The First Circuit noted in In re
Howard62 that no statute granted it subject matter jurisdiction to
review appeals from non-Article III extradition decisions, but the
court ruled that the Supplementary Treaty expressly gives "United
States courts" authority to hear appeals in cases involving the
application of Article 3(a) of the Treaty.63  With respect to the
ability of a treaty to create federal court subject matter
jurisdiction, the court declared that "the Supplementary Treaty...
has the force of law, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2."64 In other words,
the court, citing the Supremacy Clause, assumed that the appellate
jurisdiction provision was self-executing.
60. See, e.g., BLAKESLEY, supra note 21, at 74-88; CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE,
EXTRADITION, POLITICS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 201-06 (2001); William M. Hannay, An
Analysis of the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 21 INT'L LAWYER 925 (1987);
Steven Lubet, Extradition Unbound, 24 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47 (1989); Quigley, supra note 22,
at 432-33; Michael P. Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Ap-
plying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 257 (1988).
61. See Diane Marie Amann, The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition Treaty and
the Political Offense Exception, 31 INT'L LAWYER 622, 624 n.97 (1997); Bassiouni, Political
Offense, supra note 50, at 277, 279 (declaring the appeal procedure "introduces a novelty
in U.S. extradition," an "ad hoc solution of dubious wisdom" that should have been ac-
complished across the board by statute rather than by treaty); Epps, supra note 12, at 300;
Christie A. Leary, Note, The Political Offense Exception, the Irish Republican Army, and
the Supplementary Treaty, 5 J. INT'L L. STUD. 293, 314 (1999); Michelle N. Lewis, Note,
The Political Offense Exception: Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and In-
ternational Public Order, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 585, 593 (1995) (suggesting the appeal
provision reflected the contemporaneous effort to reform the extradition statutes).
62. 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993). For a description of the facts and proceedings, see
supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 1325-26 (describing the treaty as allowing "appeals taken to courts cloaked
with the judicial power of the United States"). The court also determined that the Sup-
plementary Treaty allows an appeal from the magistrate to the district court, with a second
appeal to the Court of Appeals. See id. at 1326-27; see also Epps, supra note 12, at 300
(discussing this issue). The district court did not pause over the jurisdictional issues, ex-
cept to reject the government's argument that Article 3(b) gives an appeal only to the
government, and relegates the fugitive to habeas review. See In re Howard, 791 F. Supp.
31, 33-34 (D. Mass. 1992).
64. In re Howard, 996 F.2d at 1326.
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The second case, In re Smyth, 6 involved Great Britain's effort
to obtain James Smyth, who had escaped from the Maze Prison
where he was serving a sentence for the attempted murder of a
prison officer in Northern Ireland. The government appealed the
district court's denial of extradition under Article 3(a), and the
Ninth Circuit reversed. Although the court spent a great deal of
time attempting to determine the proper meaning of Article 3(a),
it paid virtually no attention to the validity of Article 3(b). On the
issue of jurisdiction, the court stated, "[w]e have jurisdiction
because the Supplementary Treaty provides for a right of direct
appeal from district court extradition decisions made pursuant to
Article 3(a). ' ,66 The court ultimately reversed the district court's
decision to deny extradition, and remanded for entry of an order
allowing extradition.67
The Smyth court appeared to have believed that it was acting
within its ordinary Article III capacity. The court repeatedly
referred to the extradition proceedings before the district judge as
proceedings before "the district court," 68 suggesting that they were
Article III proceedings. However, the court also stated that the
district court was "conduct[ing]" the extradition proceeding
"under the authority of a treaty enacted pursuant to Article II.""6
In his dissent, Judge John Noonan seized on this language to
accuse the court of "act[ing] as though it was itself an Article II
court., 70 Yet, Judge Noonan's analysis did not go any deeper into
questions of jurisdiction. Instead, he relied on Howard, and
declared that "[t]he language of the Treaty was intended to invoke
the judicial power of the United States, that power possessed only
by an Article III court."7' Like the panel opinion, Judge Noonan
65. In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995).
66. Id. at 713.
67. See id. at 722. Smyth was extradited to the United Kingdom but was subsequently
freed pursuant to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that established joint participation of
Catholics and Protestants in the government of Northern Ireland. See Bob Egelko, Irish
Pleased by Extradite Ruling, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 15, 2000, at A5.
68. See, e.g., In re Smyth, 61 F.3d at 713.
69. Id. at 720-21.
70. In re Smyth, 72 F.3d 1433, 1434 (9th Cir. 1996) (Noonan, J, joined by Pregerson,
Reinhardt, and O'Scannlain, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). This accu-
sation supported Judge Noonan's arguments that the court ignored the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Evidence and adopted a scope of review that was too narrow.
71. Id. at 1434 ("Although the panel in our case was aware of Howard and actually
cited it, it did not adopt its analysis. The panel acted as an Article II court reviewing the
decision of an Article It court."). Contrary to Judge Noonan's assertion, I believe a fair
20031
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did not explore how a treaty could "invoke the judicial power of
the United States" without the assistance of a statute.
The third case, In re Artt,72 involved three more escapees from
73the Maze Prison. The district court found that all three were
extraditable under the Supplementary Treaty. They appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, where they made a series of constitutional
challenges to the extradition process established by federal
statutes and the Supplementary Treaty. The court began its
analysis by recognizing that Article 3(b) is a "clear departure from
th[e] established rule" that extradition rulings are not appealable.74
Nonetheless, the court declared, "Article 3(b) gives us jurisdiction
over the appellants' appeal from the district judge's Article 3(a)
findings. 7  The court then rejected a separation of powers
challenge to the federal extradition statutes.76
The escapees also contended that the Supplementary Treaty
required the court of appeals to hear the case as an Article III
court, even though the Secretary of State could ultimately review
the court's decision. As a result, they asserted, the "treaty
language clearly subjects the decisions of an Article III court to
Executive Branch review."7 7 The court's analysis of this issue was
rather coy:
We are not persuaded by appellants' argument. Even if we are
acting as an Article III court when we review the district judge's
Article 3(a) findings on appeal, there is no indication that our
decision is subject to Executive Branch "review" such that the
doctrine of separation of power is violated."
reading of the opinion indicates that the court believed it was acting under Article III but
also believed that different substantive and procedural rules apply in extradition cases.
72. 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 1999), dismissed as
moot, 249 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000).
73. Barry Artt was convicted of murdering a prison official; Pol Brennan was con-
victed of possessing explosives with intent to endanger life or injure property; and Terence
Kirby was convicted of several crimes, including felony murder. See In re Artt, 158 F.3d at
464.
74. Id. at 467.
75. Id. at 468.
76. The escapees argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 unconstitutionally allows the executive
branch to review the judgments of Article III courts. They also claimed that if judges hear
extradition cases outside Article III, they have been unconstitutionally conscripted to act
as adjuncts to the executive branch. The court rejected both challenges. See In re Artt, 158
F.3d at 469-70. For discussion of these issues, see Parry, supra note 14, at 165-69.
77. In re Artt, 158 F.3d at 469.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court explained that it was relying on the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit in DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, which had also rejected
a constitutional challenge to the extradition statute. 9 DeSilva held
the Secretary of State's discretion to refrain from extradition is not
the same as executive review, because a judge's certification of
extraditability "authorizes, but does not compel, the executive
branch to act in a certain way."80
In short, the court in In re Artt asserted subject matter
jurisdiction by first concluding that the Supplementary Treaty is
sufficient to grant jurisdiction, and second, by rejecting the
dominant view that the Secretary of State's ultimate control over
extradition, which most courts equated with executive review,
removed extradition proceedings from Article III. Nonetheless,
the court was unable to say clearly whether it was in fact acting
under Article 11.8 Moreover, even if the courts in In re Artt and
DeSilva were correct, the settled understanding remains that no82
statute provides appellate jurisdiction in extradition cases. Thus,
the primary problem created by the Supplementary Treaty-its
attempt to create federal court jurisdiction in the absence of a
statute-persists whether or not the initial proceeding is within
Article Il. 83
79. See id. at 469.
80. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997), quoted in Artt, 158
F.3d at 469. Most courts follow the Second Circuit's rulings that extradition is an Article I
proceeding, with the result that executive review of the decision raises no Article III con-
cerns. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. Indeed, an earlier Ninth Circuit case
had already rejected a similar constitutional challenge to the extradition statute by relying
on Second Circuit case law. See Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100 (2d Cir. 1996)).
81. The court reversed the district court's decision approving extradition, but later
withdrew its opinion and granted rehearing on issues relating to the Supplemental Treaty's
political offense provisions and Article 3(a)'s relaxation of the non-inquiry rule. In re
Artt. 183 F.3d at 944. Nearly a year after argument on rehearing, the court asked the Jus-
tice Department whether, in light of the Good Friday Agreement and the accompanying
release of political prisoners, the British government still sought the extraditions. See
Egelko, supra note 67. Two weeks later, Britain dropped efforts to obtain the extradition
of several fugitives, including Artt, Brennan, and Kirby. See Bob Egelko, Britain Drops
Extradition Bid, S.F. Examiner, Sept. 30, 2000, at A3. The court subsequently dismissed
the appeal. See In re Artt, 249 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2000).
82. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
83. In fact, the Supplementary Treaty may exacerbate the Article III issues surround-
ing extradition. Under the dominant view, the presence of executive review means that
extradition is an Article I proceeding, and the judges who hear extradition cases do not sit
as federal courts. Because the proceeding is not within Article III, the general appellate
jurisdiction statute (28 U.S.C.§ 1291), which applies only to the final judgments of courts,
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In sum, judicial responses to the Supplementary Treaty have
not clarified the jurisdictional issues that it raises. Lawyers
representing fugitives from Great Britain may be able to raise
creative Article 3(a) questions whenever there is a possibility of
obtaining a direct appeal. Existing case law will provide little
guidance, however, to courts concerned about their jurisdiction
over such cases.
III. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
A. The Basic Doctrine
The Constitution specifically grants Congress the power to
establish lower federal courts and to make exceptions to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction; it also lists the categories
of federal subject matter jurisdiction.8 Some scholars, most
notably Akhil Amar, argue that Congress must vest the federal
courts as a whole with all of "the judicial power," or at least the
category of judicial power that includes federal question cases.85
Federal statutes and Supreme Court case law, however, have never
adopted that view.
Although one could interpret Article III as a self-executing
grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and all other federal
courts created by Congress, that interpretation has never made
significant headway. The Supreme Court views its original
does not apply to the result of that proceeding. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying
text. Under the treaty, however, the extradition proceeding apparently can be appealed to
an Article III court, followed by executive review. Thus, the treaty creates one of two con-
stitutional difficulties: either it commands federal courts to act in a non-Article III capac-
ity-that is, as entities subject to executive revision-or it attempts to expand Article III
to include the power to decide cases without finality or conclusiveness. Either way, and in
addition to its effort to circumvent congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, the
Supplementary Treaty's grant of subject matter jurisdiction is invalid unless the dominant
view of extradition is incorrect or a treaty can change the meaning of Article III (or unless
the treaty silently prohibits executive review in Article 3(a) cases).
84. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
85. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article II1, 65 B.U. L. REV.
205, 206 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist] ("the Framers did not intend to require
the creation of lower federal courts; but ... they did require that some federal court - su-
preme or inferior - be open, at trial or on appeal, to hear and resolve finally any given
federal question, admiralty, or public ambassador case"); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-
Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990) [hereinafter
Amar, Two-Tiered]. For a summary of the congressional control debate, see RICHARD H.
FALLON, ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 348-65, 370-73 (4th ed. 1996 & Supp.).
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jurisdiction as self-executing but not exclusive.6 Moreover, the
Court recognizes that Congress has control over its appellate
jurisdiction. The Court has consistently refused to treat lower
federal court jurisdiction as self-executing. Indeed, Amar claims
that Article III is only self-executing for the Supreme Court:
If Congress were ever to enact a jurisdictional regime that
opened an impermissible gap in mandatory federal jurisdiction,
the proper "filling" of that gap would be to resurrect the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, rather than
extending the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.89
Even under Amar's framework, lower federal courts may not rely
directly on Article III for their subject matter jurisdiction;
congressional action is also necessary.
Congress has also refused to treat Article III as self-executing
or to vest the federal courts with all of "the judicial power."9 For
example, Congress did not give general federal question
jurisdiction to the district courts until 1875.91 In addition, although
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act gave the Supreme Court
86. See FALLON, ET AL., supra note 85, at 294-97 (collecting cases and discussing
Congress's regulation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction).
87. See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (stating con-
gressional grants of less than complete jurisdiction to the Supreme Court should be read as
implied exceptions to the jurisdiction given by Article III). The Court has placed some
constitutional limits on congressional power over federal court jurisdiction. See Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1871); see also infra note 94 (noting the Court's interpretation of jurisdictional statutes to
avoid constitutional issues). Despite those limits, Congress retains primary control; thus,
this Article does not address their scope or propriety. For a discussion and collection of
authorities, see FALLON, ET AL., supra note 85, at 365-79.
88. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986)
(stating the grant of "arising under" jurisdiction "is not self-executing"); Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
89. Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 85, at 257 n.168.
90. As Amar admits, the Judiciary Act "purports to confer jurisdiction" on the Su-
preme Court despite what he claims is the self-executing nature of Article III. See Amar,
Neo-Federalist, supra note 85, at 264 n.194; see also Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 85, at
1538-39 (making a similar observation). Compare Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 307, 314 (1810) (stating statutory grants of less than complete Supreme Court ju-
risdiction should be read as implied exceptions to the jurisdiction given by Article III).
91. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Even then, Congress included an
amount in controversy requirement that remained until 1980. See Federal Question Juris-
dictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-486 § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369. Congress has
never given the federal courts all of the diversity jurisdiction authorized by Article III. See
Judiciary Acts, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (setting $500 amount in controversy requirement for
diversity cases).
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jurisdiction over state court decisions that denied federal claims of
right, including treaty rights, the Act did not give the Court the
right to review state decisions that upheld federal rights. 2 Several
Supreme Court statements and holdings also support the idea of
near-plenary congressional control.93
At times, however, the Supreme Court has narrowly
interpreted some restrictions on federal court jurisdiction,
particularly Congress's attempts to interfere with jurisdiction over
94constitutional claims. The Court has also exercised control over
federal jurisdiction by refusing to allow lower federal courts to
exercise all of the jurisdiction granted by Congress. Again, the
clearest example is federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court has held that statutory federal question jurisdiction is
narrower than constitutional federal question jurisdiction, even
though Congress may have intended to grant the full extent of that
jurisdiction to the federal courts.95 Justiciability doctrines, which
also restrict federal court subject matter jurisdiction, provide
another example. The Court presents some justiciability limits as
derived from Article III, but it has crafted a set of prudential limits
that prevent federal courts from hearing cases that are within
Article III and the statutory grant. 96 Finally, abstention doctrines
also prevent federal courts from hearing cases within the statutory
grant.
97
92. See Judiciary Acts, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789). Amar suggests losing litigants whose op-
ponents' federal claims were upheld could usually claim.that their own federal rights were
denied. See Amar, Two-Tiered, supra note 85, at 1529-33. But see Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure of Article 111, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1585-93 (1990) (arguing
Amar's claim does not fit with Supreme Court practice).
93. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); supra note 88.
94. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651
(1996); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 57 & n.263 (1990); see also supra note 87 (noting the de-
bate over constitutional limits on congressional power over federal court jurisdiction).
95. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (1983). An
analogous limit applies to diversity jurisdiction as well: the Court's rule of complete diver-
sity is more restrictive than Article III's requirement of minimal diversity and is not com-
pelled by the text of the diversity statute. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806).
96. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984) (discussing constitutional and
prudential limits on standing); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (suggesting political question analysis has a prudential component).
97. See Friedman, supra note 94, at 18-20. See generally FALLON, ET AL., supra note
85, at 1222-1336 (discussing judicially-developed limitations on federal court jurisdiction).
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In short, Congress attempts to control the scope of federal
court subject matter jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court
sometimes resists those efforts. As Barry Friedman suggests, "the
contours of federal jurisdiction are resolved as the result of an
interactive process between Congress and the Court on the
appropriate uses and bounds of the federal judicial power."98
Regardless of the exact allocation of power between the court and
Congress, however,99 Congress has the primary role, in part
because the "interactive process" that Friedman describes takes
place in the context of statutory interpretation and congressional
power under Article III.
The introduction to this Article quotes the Supreme Court's
statement in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. that federal
courts "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree."1m  The
Court's statement is literally true. Congress passes jurisdictional
statutes, and the Court interprets them. Out of that interaction,
and not simply from any "judicial decree," comes the definition of
federal court subject matter jurisdiction. The Court's concern in
Kokkonen, however, was with the relationship between the courts
and Congress. The Supplementary Treaty raises the possibility
that the Court's statement is incomplete. Federal courts cannot
expand their jurisdiction by decree alone, but the question remains
whether they can exercise "power authorized by Constitution and
[treaty]" in addition to power "authorized by Constitution and
statute."'01
The weight of current doctrine suggests that a treaty cannot
grant federal courts subject matter jurisdiction. The constitutional
convention's "Madisonian Compromise" left to Congress the task
of creating lower federal courts and providing for their
jurisdiction.'0 2 Allowing a treaty to accomplish part of this task
would upset that process. In other words, if Congress's role in
98. Friedman, supra note 94, at 2-3.
99. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, The Law, Politics, and Theory of Federal Courts:
A Comment, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 454 (1991) (arguing the dialogue theory overstates the
Court's role); Michael Wells, Congress's Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 465 (1991) (making a similar argument).
100. 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2: FALLON, ET AL., supra note 85, at 7-9. Even if
this task was in part mandatory, as Amar suggests, congressional action remained neces-
sary. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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defining jurisdiction is an important part of the Madisonian
Compromise -as opposed to an interpretation of the Compromise
that stresses the goal of delay or that insists the only issue was the
creation of lower federal courts-then treaties are no substitute for
a jurisdictional statute.
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted a flexible or
functional approach to separation of powers questions related to
non-Article III courts. But these cases test the validity of
congressional actions. The separation of powers issue raised by
the Supplementary Treaty is the validity of a process that bypasses
bicameralism and creates jurisdiction with a two-thirds Senate vote
and subsequent ratification by the President. This crucial
distinction could generate a more formal analysis that would
dovetail with the Court's more general statements about
congressional control.
Finally, and most abstractly, the debate among the Supreme
Court, Congress, and commentators centers on the respective
power of the legislature and the judiciary to create and manage
federal court jurisdiction. The terms of this debate, and thus the
terms within which participants are used to thinking about these
issues, provide little room for novel methods of regulating
jurisdiction, such as treaties.
At the same time, however, treaties and other international
agreements have had an undeniable impact on federal court
jurisdiction. The more significant issue is whether that impact can
save the Supplementary Treaty or force a different understanding
of the congressional control doctrine.
B. Treaties and Federal Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Treaties and other international agreements play a significant
role in setting the boundaries of federal court jurisdiction in at
least two areas: foreign trade and claims instituted by U.S. citizens
against other countries.
In the trade context, the Free Trade Agreement between the
United States and Canada, and the North American Free Trade
Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico
provide that countervailing duty and anti-dumping claims may be
103. See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-87 (1985).
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heard by bi-national panels of experts."" Ordinarily, these disputes
are heard by the Court of International Trade, an Article III court,
with further review available in the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court."" In implementing the free trade agreements,
however, Congress precluded federal court review for cases within
the agreements if a party to the proceeding invokes the right to a
bi-national panel review.'O° In other words, the agreements and
their implementing legislation have limited federal court subject
matter jurisdiction by entrusting the merits of certain trade cases,
including the final interpretation and application of substantive
federal law, to non-judicial panels.0 7
The other prominent example is the use of treaties or
agreements to settle claims made against foreign countries." At
least in theory, a U.S. citizen or resident with a claim against
another country could file suit in federal court.'09 In practice,
however, a variety of obstacles such as sovereign immunity," the
act of state doctrine,"' and uncertain prospects for enforcing a
judgment are likely to prevent successful litigation.
104. See Barbara Bucholtz, Sawing off the Third Branch: Precluding Judicial Review of
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Assessments under Free Trade Agreements, 19
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 175, 188-94 (1995) (describing relevant provisions of both agree-
ments).
105. See id. at 183-85 (describing the administrative and judicial process for such
cases).
106. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(g)(4) (2000). The agreements con-
ceded the possibility of federal court challenges to the constitutionality of the panels, and
the implementing legislation codifies this exception. See Bucholtz, supra note 104, at 190,
192-93.
107. See generally Bucholtz, supra note 104, at 194-96, 199; 19 U.S.C § 1516a(g)(4)
(noting disputes over the constitutionality of the bi-national process remain in federal
court). Removal of federal court jurisdiction over the merits of trade disputes has gener-
ated debate over the constitutionality of these provisions. See, e.g., Matthew Burton,
Note, Assigning the Judicial Power to International Tribunals, 88 VA. L. REV. 1529 (2002)
(arguing bi-national review satisfies a flexible interpretation of Article III).
108. See HENKIN, supra note 13, at 299-303 (describing the common practice of set-
tling claims by agreements or treaties); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
679 (1981).
109. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 663-67 (describing lower court proceedings).
Article III authorizes federal courts to hear such suits under federal question jurisdiction,
if applicable, or diversity jurisdiction "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) ("[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided .... ).
111. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990) ("The act of state doctrine ... requires that, in the process of deciding [cases],
the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.").
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
For example, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act not only
codifies the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity but also
provides the sole statutory basis for federal court subject matter
jurisdiction over disputes between U.S. residents and other
countries."' The Act also complements the International Claims
Settlement Act, which recognizes executive power to settle claims
and creates largely non-judicial mechanisms to enhance
settlements."' Together, these statutes reflect Congress's
judgment that many claims against foreign states are best resolved
diplomatically and administratively, with the result that such
claims should usually be beyond the reach of federal court
jurisdiction, even though they fall within the scope of Article III.
Finally, no discussion of claims settlement is complete without
recognizing the Supreme Court's ruling in Dames & Moore v.
Regan, which held that the President's authority to settle claims is
broad enough to include the power to terminate claims pending in
federal court."14 The Court insisted that the settlements at issue
did not alter federal court jurisdiction because they "simply
effected a change in the substantive law governing the lawsuit.",1 
5
The consequence of that "change in law," however, was the
removal to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal of a class of cases that
were pending or could have been brought in federal court.
The claims and trade limitations on federal court jurisdiction
raise some separation of powers concerns. Yet these limitations
have significant historical pedigrees. They also implicate foreign
policy interests and individual rights, and have a history of
generating international tensions that require political resolution.
The political branches and the courts could well agree on the need
for caution in such areas. Certainly, the executive branch and, to
some extent, Congress, want to avoid too much judicial
interference in foreign policy issues, while the courts might have
cause to worry that cases in these areas would infringe upon their
ability to make and enforce final decisions.
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000).
113. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1622(g) (2002) (creating, among other things, the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission). The Commission's decisions are final. See 22 U.S.C. §
1622 (g).
114. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675-88 (holding longstanding prac-
tice accompanied by congressional acquiescence established Congress's consent to suspen-
sion and termination of claims by executive agreement).
115. Id. at 684-85.
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These policy arguments, however, obscure a more crucial
point. Changes in the scope of federal court jurisdiction in the
context of international trade and claims settlement are the
product of statutes as well as treaties.116 Thus, they ultimately
provide little support for attempts to restrict or expand federal
court jurisdiction by treaty alone." The claims and trade
examples do not change the presumption that federal courts can
hear cases arising under treaties only when federal statutes vest
the courts with jurisdiction over such cases.
Return now to extradition proceedings, which usually arise
under treaties. With the exception of the Supplementary Treaty,
these treaties do not create federal court jurisdiction. Instead,
Congress created a jurisdictional and procedural statute for
extraditions that has been interpreted to preclude appeals and
requires the Secretary of State to review the submission. Perhaps
a judge could hear a non-Article III extradition proceeding
pursuant to a treaty without specific statutory authorization. In
fact, this issue vexed the federal courts in the early nineteenth
century and led to passage of the international extradition statute
in 1848.2 s The Supplementary Treaty however, goes farther. By
vesting the federal courts with appellate jurisdiction over certain
issues, the Supplementary Treaty directly challenges congressional
control of federal court jurisdiction. " '
IV. SELF-EXECUTING EXTRADITION TREATIES
The doctrine of congressional control is not the typical
framework for assessing the domestic legal effect of a treaty. The
ordinary approach is simply to ask if the treaty is self-executing. If
the Supplementary Treaty's appellate jurisdiction provisions are
self-executing, then the fact that those provisions trample on
116. Again, Dames & Moore insisted the President's authority to suspend and termi-
nate claims in federal court had nothing to do with jurisdiction and derived from implied
congressional consent, not from inherent executive authority. See id. at 684-88.
117. Cf Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998) (suggesting treaties cannot give
federal courts jurisdiction over claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Related to
the restriction of jurisdiction is the use of a treaty to limit the ability of law enforcement
officials to enforce federal law. Thus, in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), the
Court held that a treaty with Great Britain superseded portions of a federal statute and
narrowed the statutory authority of the Coast Guard to search British flag vessels outside
U.S. territorial waters.
118. See infra notes 143-80 and accompanying text.
119. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 6, at 8.
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congressional control of federal court jurisdiction has little
relevance. After all, the point of self-execution is to bypass
Congress by using the treaty power to make law.
A. The Basic Issue
The contemporary self-execution debate centers on when a
court should enforce a treaty as law.120 Some commentators argue
that treaties are almost always self-executing, so that they become
judicially enforceable upon ratification without the need for any
additional action by Congress. 2  Others argue that treaties are
almost never self-executing, so that they function as judicially
enforceable law only when Congress takes additional steps to.• 122
implement the treaties. The stakes are significant, because a
self-executing treaty overrides inconsistent state legislation
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause1 23 and trumps prior inconsistent
federal legislation under the "last in time" rule.
Faced with the fact that some treaties are self-executing and
some are not, most commentators now recognize that they cannot
resolve the issue with an all-or-nothing answer. The debate now
turns on whether there is a presumption in favor of self-execution,
with a rough consensus of scholars claiming there should be such aS 125
presumption. The arguments for or against a presumption
present a complex mix of text, history, precedent, federalism,
separation of powers arguments, and policy issues.
120. See Carlos M. Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695 (1995). Determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing is not the
same as determining whether the United States is obligated under the treaty. See
HENKIN, supra note 13, at 203-04 (noting the United States is bound by treaty obligations
whether or not they are self-executing).
121. See JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
64 (1996) ("The constitutionally preferable view is that no treaty is inherently non-self-
executing except those which would seek to declare war on behalf of the United States....
[I]t also seems clear that all treaties are self-executing except those (or the portions of
them) which, by their terms considered in context, require domestic implementing legisla-
tion or seek to declare war on behalf of the United States.").
122. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1962, 2092-93 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Struc-
tural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2220, 2254 (1999).
123. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Yoo, Globalism, supra note 122, at 1958.
124. See Vizquez, Four Doctrines, supra note 120, at 696.
125. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 122, at 1959 ("[A] developing academic consensus
has emerged that sharply criticizes non-self-execution.").
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My view is that courts should apply a mild presumption in
favor of self-execution, to place the burden on those who seek to, 126
prevent judicial enforcement of the Treaty. Even those who
favor a stronger presumption in favor of self-execution, however,
do not claim that a self-executing treaty can displace Congress on
any topic of legislation."' In fact, the most important development
in the debate over self-execution has been an effort to analyze the
specific circumstances where a treaty is, or is not, self-executing
instead of relying solely on blanket arguments about the domestic
legal status of treaties.' 28 This more careful analysis specifically
includes separation of powers concerns that may require
congressional action in particular contexts. Thus, as Carlos
Vrzquez, argues, one basis for denying self-execution is when "the
treaty purports to accomplish what under our Constitution may be
accomplished only by statute." 9
The test for determining which congressional powers are
exclusive and which powers also fall within the scope of the treaty
power is elusive. Vdizquez suggests that certain subjects of
legislation may be beyond the treaty power, such as defining
criminal conduct, raising revenue, or making appropriations.' °
The power to define federal court jurisdiction may also belong in
this category, at least presumptively.' The Constitution separates
126. This is not the place for a full elaboration of my views on self-execution. Suffice it
to say that text, original meaning, and precedent all support a presumption of self-
execution in some contexts, but changes in the nature of treaties, federalism and separa-
tion of powers concerns, and problems with remedies provide arguments for overcoming
the presumption in specific cases. I plan to discuss these issues in future articles. See su-
pra note *. The discussion in Part IV draws on these ongoing projects.
127. See HENKIN, supra note 13, at 203 (suggesting treaties cannot intrude on congres-
sional power to declare war, appropriate funds, or enact criminal law); PAUST, supra note
121, at 59-62 (conceding a treaty cannot displace Congress's power to declare war and
admitting appropriations may be in the same category, while also arguing in favor of con-
current power over appropriations).
128. See, e.g., Vdzquez, supra note 120, at 696-97.
129. Id. at 697.
130. See id. at 718-19; see also supra note 127. In this context, Vdzquez also notes the
split of authority on whether extradition treaties are self-executing.
131. Vfizquez appears to see the management of federal court jurisdiction as a topic
separate from the issue of self-execution. See Vazquez, supra note 120, at 699 n.20. Of
course, the distinction Vdzquez draws between enforceability and jurisdiction also reflects
careful federal courts thinking as well as the simple fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 has mooted
the jurisdiction issue in most cases involving treaties. In any event, my goal is to describe
how the Supplementary Treaty fails under current doctrine. I am not claiming that cur-
rent doctrine is optimal or that treaties should never be able to create or restrict federal
court jurisdiction.
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Congress's power over federal courts from other legislative
powers, and in that context, expressly refers to "Congress" instead
of merely to "laws., 132  Settled doctrine assumes Congress has
primary control over federal jurisdiction, subject only to judicial
interpretation.13 Structural and policy concerns suggest that the
basic organization and responsibilities of the branches of the
federal government should derive from legislation and not directly
from negotiations with other countries.
The careful approach to self-execution has implications for
general assumptions about extradition treaties and the specific
jurisdictional issues raised by the Supplementary Treaty. The
standard view is that extradition treaties are self-executing.-
4
Courts and commentators repeat this common understanding
again and again, often accompanied by citations to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Terlinden v. Ames or, less frequently, United
States v. Rauscher3 6 and Valentine v. United States ex rel.
Neidecker 3 7 Yet, the question of whether an extradition treaty
should be self-executing is far more complicated."
The federal extradition statute has been on the books since
1848 to provide a forum and procedure for extradition hearings. 9
Thus, none of these cases needed to-and none even purported
to-address whether self-execution extends to creating federal• • - .- 140
court jurisdiction. Moreover, the Supreme Court's cases do not
support a blanket claim of self-execution across the board, and
certainly not for the creation of jurisdiction. Terlinden, for
example, suggests that extradition treaties are self-executing for
the executive branch but not for the courts, 4' while Rauscher and
132. Compare PAUST, supra note 121, at 62 (relying on the Constitution's statement
that appropriations must be "made by Law" to argue that treaties, as laws, may do so).
133. See supra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
134. See WHITEMAN, supra note 10, at 734.
135. 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902). Many courts and commentators cite Bassiouni's extradi-
tion treatise, which in turn cites Terlinden. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 16, at 72 & n.172.
136. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
137. 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
138. As VAzquez observes, "it has ... been said that extradition treaties are by their
nature self-executing and, inconsistently, that they are non-self-executing." Vdzquez, su-
pra note 120, at 719.
139. See Act of Aug. 12, 1848, 9 Stat. 302.
140. See Vfzquez, supra note 120, at 699 n.20 (recognizing no treaty can be self-
executing in the lower federal courts without a jurisdictional statute).
141. The Court said that "[tjreaties of extradition are executory in their character,"
with the result that "'the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
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Valentine simply looked to extradition treaties for substantive
rules.142
In short, self-execution doctrine may not encompass the
power to create federal court jurisdiction. Moreover, the general
claim that extradition treaties are self-executing, even if true, has
nothing to do with the power to create jurisdiction. As the next
section will demonstrate, early extradition litigation seems to
confirm that self-execution has not traditionally included the
power to create jurisdiction.
B. Extradition and the History of Self-Execution
The 1794 Jay Treaty between the United States and Great
Britain required, among other things, extradition of murderers and
forgers.143 Because Congress never passed legislation to implement
ment."' Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)); see David L. Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Consti-
tutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1, 19-21 (2002) (explaining the term "executory"
equates with finding that a treaty is not self-executing as a source of law for courts). Thus,
Terlinden appears to hold that extradition treaties are not self-executing. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 44, at 447; Vizquez, supra note 120, at 719. But Terlinden may also
have equated executory treaty provisions with the exercise of executive power. The Court
declared,
The power to surrender [in extradition] is clearly included within the treaty-
making power and the corresponding power of appointing and receiving ambas-
sadors and other public ministers. Its exercise pertains to public policy and gov-
ernmental administration, is devolved on the Executive authority, and the war-
rant of surrender is issued by the Secretary of State as the representative of the
President in foreign affairs.
184 U.S. at 289. The Court also stated, "The decisions of the Executive Department in
matters of extradition, within its own sphere, and in accordance with the Constitution, are
not open to judicial revision." Id. at 290. This language suggests the President can obtain
the authority to execute a warrant of surrender directly under a treaty. In other words,
Terlinden may hold that an executory treaty provision can be self-executing as a grant of
power to the executive branch, even if it is not self-executing for the courts.
142. Rauscher stated a treaty is self-executing "whenever its provisions prescribe a rule
by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined. And, when such
rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for
a rule of decision for the case before it." United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419
(1886). In Valentine, the Court consulted the substantive provisions of an extradition
treaty and ruled they did not grant a power to extradite citizens. See Valentine v. United
States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10-18 (1936).
143. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between His Britannic Majesty and
the United States of America, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 27, 8 Stat. 116, 129. Be-
ginning in 1788, the United States entered into a series of agreements-analogous to ex-
tradition-for the return of deserting sailors to their home countries. In contrast to its
treatment of extradition, Congress consistently passed legislation to implement these
agreements. See Parry, supra note 14, at 105, 114 n.111, 120 n.143.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
this part of the treaty, the extradition process remained unclear
when Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, was arrested in 1799
in Charleston, South Carolina on the charge that he committed
murder on the British ship Hermione.'44
Although British authorities wanted custody of Robbins,
District Court Judge Bee was reluctant to deliver him without a
request from the administration.4 1 Secretary of State Pickering
suggested that Judge Bee "should be directed to deliver up the
offender in question, on the demand of the British government, by
its Minister."' 146 A less certain President Adams stated, "How far
the president of the U.S. would be justifiable in directing the
judge, to deliver up the offender, is not clear. I have no objection
to advise and request him to do it.' ' 147  Pickering promptly
informed Judge Bee of the President's "advice and request."148
In the subsequent court proceedings, Robbins challenged the
court's jurisdiction and made several other arguments against• 1 4 1
extradition, all of which Judge Bee rejected. On the issue of
jurisdiction, Judge Bee declared:
When application was first made, I thought this a matter for the
executive interference, because the act of congress respecting
fugitives from justice, from one state to another, refers it
altogether to the executive of the states; but as the law and the
treaty are silent upon the subject, recurrence must be had to the
general powers vested in the judiciary by law and the
constitution, the 3d article of which declares the judicial power
shall extend to treaties, by express words.... If it were
otherwise, there would be a failure of justice.5
144. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100
YALE L.J. 229, 237, 286-87 (1990); see also Parry, supra note 14, at 108-14 (discussing the
Robbins extradition). The convention among commentators is to use "Robbins" to refer
to Thomas Nash/Jonathan Robbins, despite the fact that his name is spelled "Robins" in
the case caption from the district court. See infra note 149.
145. See Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 288.
146. Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Adams (May 15, 1799), in ADAMS
PAPERS, roll 394, at 219-219a (Mass. Hist. Soc. Microfilm ed.).
147. Letter from John Adams to the Secretary of State (May 21, 1799), in ADAMS
PAPERS, roll 119, #46 (Mass. Hist. Soc. Microfilm ed.).
148. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Thomas Bee (June 3, 1799), in PICKERING
PAPERS, roll 11, at 209 (F. Allis ed. Mass. Hist. Soc. Microfilm ed. 1966).
149. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (C.C.D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
150. Id. at 833.
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In other words, Judge Bee treated the Robbins extradition as a
federal question case and found jurisdiction directly under Article
III and the treaty. 5'
With no statute to implement the treaty or provide federal
question jurisdiction, Judge Bee's ruling meant either that Article
III was self-executing for lower federal courts under some
circumstances-which is the natural reading of his holding-or
that the treaty was self-executing as a grant of jurisdiction. The
case generated a political firestorm after British authorities quickly
tried, convicted, and executed Robbins.'52 Controversy centered
on Robbins' claim that he was a citizen and the perception that
President Adams had ordered Judge Bee to turn Robbins over to a
once and future enemy. Judge Bee's assertion of jurisdiction also
received criticism, however.
Senator Charles Pinckney complained that the court




Representative Albert Gallatin argued that the treaty was not self-
executing and that Judge Bee's assertion of jurisdiction was
improper without a statutory grant.54 More generally, opponents
of the administration contended that congressional power would
weaken and executive power would increase if the executive could
refer treaty issues to the federal courts in the absence of a
jurisdictional statute. They also suggested that self-execution and
an expansive treaty power could lead to restrictions on individual
liberty.5 '
Congressman John Marshall defended the President with a
celebrated speech that included the famous claim that the
President is "the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations."'5 6  Marshall sought to neutralize Judge Bee's
questionable jurisdictional ruling by restating it as a doctrine that,
because the judicial power extends to treaties, judges may
151. For discussions of Judge Bee's options for asserting jurisdiction, see Parry, supra
note 14, at 110-11, and Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 291-92.
152. See Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 833; Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 304-08.
153. See CHARLES PINCKNEY, THREE LETTERS, WRITTEN AND ORIGINALLY
PUBLISHED, UNDER THE SIGNATURE OF A SOUTH CAROLINA PLANTER 3, 12-13, 19-20
(Philadelphia: Aurora 1799); see also Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 331-32 (discussing
Pinckney's arguments).
154. See Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 336-37.
155. Id. at 315-16, 321.
156. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (Statement of Rep. Marshall) [hereinafter Mar-
shall].
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"perhaps... be called in" to help implement them even without
legislation.15 1 More generally, Marshall defended a strong version
of self-execution. Treaties bind the nation and are the supreme
law of the land, and the President must execute them if they are
sufficiently clear, whether or not Congress passes implementing
legislation.1 8  Self-executing treaties, in other words, could
empower the executive as well as the judiciary. Indeed, the role of
courts in executing treaties would in some instances be limited to
assisting the President when he chose to seek such assistance.'59
Marshall's argument, however, did not sweep away the
opposition, and his opponents continued to seek legislation to
regulate extradition. 16' The Robbins affair became an important
and recurring issue during the election of 1800, in which Adams
was decisively defeated and high Federalist executive power claims
were rejected.162 Indeed, after Robins, the United States did not
extradite anyone for more than forty years. Thus, while later cases
would exhume Marshall's speech to support executive foreign
163affairs authority, those views, particularly Marshall's early views
on self-execution, were controversial. Indeed, Marshall's later
opinion in Foster v. Neilson seems to abandon his more extreme
claims about executive implementation of . 1e6
Extradition provisions returned in the 1842 treaty between
the United States and Great Britain. 16  Once again, Congress did
not pass a statute to implement the extradition provisions of the
treaty, and the executive and courts approached the next several
extraditions with heightened caution. In an opinion approving the
extradition of Christiana Cochrane after a hearing before a
commissioner, Attorney General John Nelson relied on Marshall's
157. See id. at 615 (suggesting that in the course of the President's execution of a
treaty, "judicial aid... may, perhaps, in some instances be called in").
158. See id. at 614; Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 339-40.
159. See Marshall, supra note 156, at 615; Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 349-51.
160. As Wedgwood observes, the House had already rejected the motion to censure
Adams before Marshall spoke; his speech may have increased the margin of victory for the
final vote. See Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 354.
161. See id. at 355.
162. See id. at 354-62.
163. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314-20 (1936); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1471, 1513-14 & nn.155-56 (1999) (collecting citations).
164. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see Wedgwood, supra note 144, at 365.
165. See Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 572, 576; see also
Parry, supra note 14, at 115-16 (discussing the treaty).
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interpretation of Robins to assert that the executive branch did not
require additional legislation to implement the 1842 treaty. He
also declared that judicial involvement in extradition is "ancillary"
to executive power, and that an extradition "is not a case in law or
equity within the scope and meaning" of Article 111.166 In brief, the
Attorney General relied on Marshall's arguments to claim that the
treaty was self-executing as a grant of power to the President and
that it contemplated no necessary role for the judiciary.
In re Sheazle provided the first judicial opinion on the 1842
treaty.' 67  In this case, England sought the extradition of several
fugitive sailors on piracy charges. After a hearing before a state
magistrate, the sailors sought habeas relief. In his circuit court
opinion denying habeas, Justice Woodbury first observed that the
Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed state judicial officials "to examine
and commit offenders in cases arising under the laws and
jurisdiction of the United States."' ' The treaty, in turn, "seems to
recognize and adopt the propriety of such an examination under it,
'by any judges or other magistrates' having power over similar
inquiries.' 6 9 As a result, Justice Woodbury avoided Judge Bee's
jurisdictional holding by finding that state judicial officers had
authority under the Judiciary Act to hear extradition cases under
the treaty."7  Justice Woodbury also suggested however, that
treaties could sometimes be self-executing for the executive
branch.'7'
166. 4 Op. Att'y. Gen. 201, 208-11 (1843).
167. 21 F. Cas. 1214 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 12,734).
168. Id. at 1216 (citing Judiciary Acts, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1216-17.
171. Woodbury ruled there was no need for legislation to provide the President with
authority to issue a warrant of surrender under the treaty and described two kinds of
treaty provisions:
Now, if a treaty stipulated for some act to be done, entirely judicial, and not pro-
vided for by a general act of congress, like that before cited, as to examinations
such as here before magistrates, it could hardly be done without the aid or pre-
liminary direction of some act of congress prescribing the court to do it, and the
form. But where the aid of no such act of congress seems necessary in respect to
a ministerial duty, devolved on the executive, by the supreme law of a treaty, the
executive need not wait and does not wait for acts of congress to direct such du-
ties to be done and how.
Id. at 1217. The hearing fell into the first category, while issuing a warrant fell into the
second category. Treaty provisions that created tasks for courts required some imple-
menting legislation, while provisions that gave power directly to the executive branch
could be self-executing-at least for ministerial duties. (Many discussions of extradition in
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The third and final case began when Nicholas Metzger was
arrested for embezzlement and held under the 1843 extradition
treaty with France. Responding to a request from the French
consul, District Judge Betts ruled that he had jurisdiction to
determine whether Metzger could be extradited even though
Congress had not passed a statute to implement the treaty.
Judge Betts conceded that the provision in the treaty, which
allowed the executive branch to extradite with the "aid of judicial
authority," did not confer jurisdiction because the courts could not
act "without express authorization of law.' ' 174 Instead, Judge Betts
joined Justice Woodbury in avoiding Judge Bee's controversial
assertion of jurisdiction. For Judge Betts, the Judiciary Act
"allot[s] to the.., district courts cognizance of all crimes and
offences cognizable under the authority of the United States and
accordingly, transactions declared by law to be offences occurring
in foreign territories . . . fall necessarily within the criminal
jurisdiction of those courts.' ' 75  Having determined that the
Judiciary Act provided jurisdiction, Judge Betts ruled that the
treaty was a self-executing source of substantive law.'76
Metzger petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The Court noted that the sufficiency of the evidence for a
warrant required a "judicial decision," and furthermore, was "very
properly referred.., to the judgment of a judicial officer.",
177
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the
petition. The reasoning in Metzger is opaque, but the decision
rested in part on the lack of a clear statutory basis for jurisdiction
in the district court, and even more so on the Supreme Court's
supposed lack of statutory habeas jurisdiction."' Importantly, theCourt's ruling relieved it of the need to examine the source of
the mid-nineteenth century-especially before adoption of the extradition statute-
assumed the executive's role in extradition was ministerial and did not include executive
review. See Parry, supra note 14, at 150-53.) For additional discussion of Sheazle, see id.
at 125 & n.171.
172. See Convention for the Surrender of Criminals Between the United States of
America and His Majesty the King of the French, Nov. 9, 1843, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 580, 582.
173. In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232, 234-35 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511).
174. Id. at 234.
175. Id. at 234 (discussing I Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789)). Judge Betts and Justice Woodbury
relied on different sections of the Judiciary Act. See supra note 168.
176. See id. at 234-35.
177. In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 188-89 (1847).
178. See id. at 191-92. For an extensive discussion, see Parry, supra note 14, at 127-34.
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Judge Betts' jurisdiction and the relationship between the
executive and the judicial branches in extradition cases. The Court
simply affirmed the commonsense notion that judges should be
involved in extradition proceedings without having to explain the
basis for their involvement in any particular case.
The Supreme Court's avoidance strategy ultimately forced the
issue onto Congress's agenda. Metzger next sought habeas from a
state court judge, who found his confinement unlawful because
"legislation is required to enforce the delivery, and secure the
subsequent possession, of the fugitive."17 9 Although pressure had
been building for congressional action, the state court decision was
the direct catalyst for the passage of an international extradition
statute in 1848.
The extradition statute, indeed, settled the jurisdiction
question. Courts no longer were forced to interpret the Judiciary
Act expansively to gain jurisdiction over extradition cases. Yet,
the issue of jurisdiction was important enough to warrant revisiting
by legal scholars later in the nineteenth century. In the most
extensive discussion, Samuel Spear offered a forceful critique of
each case. In the case of Robins, he argued that the treaty
"needed legislation to make it operative" for either the executive
or the courts to decide extradition cases,"" and that neither Judge
Bee nor President Adams had authority to carry out an extradition
without additional legislation.' 82  After discussing the 1843
Attorney General opinion and the Sheazle and Metzger cases,
Spear criticized the doctrine of self-execution as placing too much
power in the hands of the President. Furthermore, he declared
that extradition treaties "address themselves to the legislative
179. In re Metzger, 1 Barb. 248, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847). The court made clear its
conclusion that the self-execution doctrine would cede too much power to the executive.
See id. at 262-63. For additional discussion, see Parry, supra note 14, at 118 & n.138, 135,
223.
180. See Parry, supra note 14, at 135 & n.223.
181. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-
STATE 57 (3d ed. 1885).
182. See id. ("[T]he surrender of Robbins was without legal authority. The treaty gave
Judge Bee no authority to make the surrender, and the President could give him none.
The President himself had no such authority; and if he had, he did not directly exercise
it.").
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power of Congress, and are to be executed by its aid and co-
operation." 
183
John Bassett Moore took a more sanguine view of what he
termed "a speculative question, since general legislation on that
subject is now provided."''1 4 His analysis began with the premise
that the Supremacy Clause makes a treaty self-executing
"whenever it is directly operative without the aid of the
legislature," and proceeded directly to the conclusion that "[t]his
has been held to be the case with extradition treaties." 85 Although
Moore cited the relevant cases, he failed to distinguish between
executive authority to execute a surrender warrant, jurisdiction to
hear an extradition case, and the ability of an extradition treaty to
operate as a rule of decision in a case. With the exception of
Robins, none of the relevant cases suggests that extradition
treaties are self-executing across the board, and Moore's analysis is
flawed to the extent he meant to suggest such a sweeping rule.
This summary of early extradition cases confirms that using a
treaty to create federal jurisdiction was controversial and largely
disfavored in the early and mid-nineteenth century. History, thus,
appears to dovetail with contemporary views on self-execution.
Cases under the Supplementary Treaty do not address the issue of
proper jurisdiction because they never squarely confront it. As a
result, history supports and recent cases cannot disturb the
conclusion that under current doctrine, federal courts should
refuse appeals under the Supplementary Treaty until Congress
passes appropriate legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
In a dramatic departure from ordinary practice, the
Supplementary Treaty attempts to create federal court appellate
jurisdiction without implementing legislation. This Article
demonstrates that, consistent with prevailing views of self-
execution, and to maintain congressional control of federal court
jurisdiction, federal courts should refuse to enforce the appeal
183. Id. at 61. Spear misunderstood Sheazle and Metzger to hold that no legislation
was necessary to implement the 1842 treaty. See id. at 58-59. In fact, both cases held that
legislation was necessary for purposes of jurisdiction but that existing statutes sufficed.
184. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE
RENDITION 99 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1996) (1891).
185. Id. at 100 (citing Metzger, Rauscher, Robins, and Sheazle, among other cases).
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provisions of the Supplementary Treaty in the absence of an
implementing statute.
The history of extradition litigation also provides an
additional lesson. In the years before the extradition statute, no
federal court refused to hear an extradition case. Additionally, no
court vacated an extradition decision on jurisdictional grounds.
The Sheazle and Metzger courts made creative use of the Judiciary
Act to get around the lack of specific implementing legislation.
Their goal, presumably, was to prevent the frustration of
important foreign affairs objectives and to ensure the nation would
not be embarrassed by hindering treaty obligations.1
7
The assertion by federal courts of jurisdiction under the
Supplementary Treaty should be seen as a contemporary version
of this effort. If there is any way under existing statutes to support
jurisdiction contemplated by a treaty, a proper concern for the
foreign affairs interests of the United States requires federal courts
to adopt that construction. With respect to the Supplementary
Treaty's appellate jurisdiction provisions, however, no eligible
statute exists. Without a new statute or a change in the self-
execution doctrine, federal courts cannot hear appeals under the
Supplementary Treaty.
186. Nor is there any reason to limit this conclusion to extradition. Extradition is a
core foreign affairs subject and a traditional topic of treaty negotiation. If an extradition
treaty cannot create federal court jurisdiction, a similar rule should apply to other treaties
as well. As I already observed, however, my claim here is primarily descriptive. See supra
note 131. The circumstances, if any, under which treaties should be able to create jurisdic-
tion is a topic for another article.
187. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO.
ST. L.J. 649, 680 (2002) (describing judicial efforts to avoid embarrassing the United States
on the international stage as "a persistent riff in foreign relations law doctrine"). Extradi-
tion proceedings have an inherent ability to embarrass the United States, as the events
leading to the Supplementary Treaty demonstrate. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
188. Federal courts should therefore assume, in the treaty context, that Congress in-
tended to confer jurisdiction under existing statutes, even though in other contexts the
presumption has been that Congress did not extend jurisdiction to the constitutional
maximum. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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